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Introduction
The possibility of creating human embryonic stem cell lines from the inner cell
mass of blastocysts has led to considerable debate about how these scientific
developments should be regulated. Part of this debate has focused on the
ethical analysis and part on how this analysis should influence policymaking1.
In this paper, I want to look at both issues and present what I believe are the
best arguments against the derivation of human stem cells in a way that leads
to the destruction or killing of the human entity of which they are a part. My
discussion will thus cover:
human embryonic stem cells derived by killing the embryo
human fetal stem cells derived by killing the fetus
human infant stem cells derived by killing the infant
human adult stem cells derived by killing the adult.
The discussion falls in three parts. I first present a critical analysis of the most
common arguments showing that the derivation and use of stem cells are
morally unproblematic (pro–stem cell arguments). I then look at the arguments
showing that the derivation and use of stem cells are problematic (anti–stem
cell arguments). Following this, I analyze the policy stalemate that these two
opposing views lead to and consider the suggestion that the stalemate can be
resolved by requiring consistency between different areas of regulation.
The Reductio of the Pro–Stem Cell Arguments
By far the most common pro–stem cell argument is that derivation of human
embryonic stem cells is morally innocuous because human embryos have no
moral status. By analyzing their characteristics, we can see that they are not
persons and that it is not wrong to kill them, and we can also see that they do
not qualify for any kind of “lower” moral status (for instance, based on
sentience). Given that a few other provisos are fulfilled (e.g., concerning
permission from the owners of the embryo or gametes), it can then be shown
that derivation of stem cells is morally acceptable, perhaps even mandatory. I
call this “the standard liberal argument.”
One main problem with this argument is that it proves far too much. This is
not a new insight, and I do not want to claim any originality for it, but it is
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worth reiterating because the full consequences of the argument are often
suppressed in the public debate. The standard argument proves too much in a
number of directions.
First, and perhaps most important, it justifies the (nonpainful) killing and use
of any prepersonal human entity from the fertilized egg to the prepersonal
infant. Such a killing can be justified by any kind of net benefit to others. In the
current context, it can therefore just as easily justify the killing of infants for
their stem cells as it can the destruction of embryos for the same purpose.
There is no in principle difference between the two killings.2
Second, it places no restrictions on the use of biological material from
prepersonal human entities that can justify the destruction of these entities, as
long as those uses are beneficial. The derivation of a new and effective
antiwrinkle cream can therefore be a perfectly acceptable justification for the
production and destruction of embryos (or fetuses or infants, although the
price would probably be quite high for the infant-derived variety). The attrac-
tion of the standard liberal argument seems to be twofold: (1) it solves a whole
range of bioethical problems in one fell swoop, from embryo research to
euthanasia; and (2) it is attractively economical by locating the wrongness of
killing in one and only one consideration. One may, however, wonder whether
it is not the result of a misapplication of Occam’s razor. If moral values and
judgments supervene on natural features of the world, do we then have any
reason to believe that the supervenience relationship is of the exceedingly
simple kind that personhood theories posit? If I tried to claim that the beauty
of a painting was only, or even primarily, due to how the color black had been
used (i.e., if I claimed that the only part of the painting important to the
supervenience relation between the physical painting and our perception of it
was the black parts), I would rightly be taken to task for this ludicrous
simplification. But are personhood theories not in the same boat by claiming
that there is one and only one feature of any killing that makes it wrong?
A further problem is that the standard liberal argument normally hides some
real differences between personhood theorists. They may all agree that embryos
are not persons, but at the other end of prepersonal human life, in infancy, they
advocate slightly different criteria for the ascription of personhood. One set of
criteria will therefore permit the killing of a human individual that, based on
another set of criteria, would have been strongly prohibited as the killing of a
person. Personhood theorists are also wont to claim that personhood is a
threshold concept. This threshold claim can be understood in two different
ways: first, as a claim that either you are a person or you are not a person and
there are no partial persons; and second, as a claim that during the develop-
ment of an infant personhood is attained at some point and is then a stable
trait. The first of these claims does not entail the second nor vice versa. This is
important to realize because it could mean that infants go in and out of
personhood a number of times during their development. Let us, for instance,
say that personhood is dependent on knowing that you have a life (existence
over time) and valuing that life (existence over time).3 This is clearly a fairly
high-level mental trait or ability, and if it develops in a way similar to other
high-level traits or abilities, it will not just appear one day and then be present
(even as a capability) from then on. Other high-level traits or abilities appear,
then disappear, then appear again, and so on until they are finally permanently
established.4
The Ethical Case against Stem Cell Research
373
Another type of pro–stem cell argument tries to bypass the question of moral
status by showing that stem cell derivation is justified on direct consequential-
ist grounds. If the good that can be attained is of a sufficient magnitude, then
it can outweigh the killing of a certain number of human entities. It is justified
to sacrifice some for the benefit of others (as numerous variations of the trolley
example are supposed to show5 ).
This kind of argument may again prove too much —for instance, that it is
also justified to sacrifice some adults if the benefits to others are sufficient.
It does, however, also suffer from another problem caused by the embryonic
state of present stem cell research. The benefits that are put into the balance to
justify the sacrifice are mainly the therapeutic potential promised by stem cell
therapy. The public presentation of the benefits of stem cell research has often
been characterized by the promise of huge and immediate benefits. As with
many other scientific breakthroughs, the public has been promised real benefits
within 5–10 years (i.e., in this case, significant stem cell therapies in routine
clinical use).6 Several of the 5–10 years have now elapsed, and the promised
therapies are still not anywhere close to routine clinical use.7 There are simi-
larities to the initial enthusiastic presentation of gene therapy in the late 1980s
and the later problems encountered, and some reason to fear that stem cell
therapies will have an equally long trajectory between theoretical possibility
and clinical practice. It is likely that many of the current sufferers from some of
the conditions for which stem cell therapies have been promised will be long
dead before the therapies actually arrive.8 We are also in a situation where we
do not know which, if any, of the possible lines of stem cell research is going to
lead to the therapeutic breakthroughs.
This situation can also be modeled by a trolley example. Our trolley is
hurtling down the track, and we are approaching a junction where we have to
choose between two tracks that both disappear into the distance. On track 1,
there are, at what looks like regular intervals, people lying on the track whom
we will kill, and there are injured and suffering people sitting at the side of the
track whom we will not be able to help. On track 2, the same is the case but
there are even more people lying on the track. There is, however, a large sign
saying that there is a possibility that we may learn how to stop the trolley
somewhere along the track and proceed in a way so that we can both save
those lying on the track and help those sitting at the side. Which track should
we choose? On track 1 we will be killing and leaving people unhelped, and on
track 2 we will be killing more people and leaving the same number unhelped,
but we will have the possibility that at some point this will be made good by
our learning to stop the trolley and proceeding in a helpful manner. One track
has a certain outcome, one an outcome that may be better or may be worse
than the baseline certain outcome. Our assessment of what to do must depend
on a number of factors, including (1) our assessment of the probability of
learning how to stop and of the time span before we have learned this, (2) our
assessment of the probability that other things will happen that will remove
some people from the track and help the needy at the side, (3) our temporal
discount rate, and (4) our degree of risk aversion.
Now, it may be tempting to claim that risk aversivity should play no role in
rational decisionmaking,9 but, given that the probabilities are not strictly
quantifiable, denying a separate role to our attitudes to risk will only mean that
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we will change our (supposedly unbiased) probability estimates to include this
attitude component.
In the situation being contemplated here it would be rational to choose
track 2, the “uncertain” track, if in our assessment probability 1 was sufficiently
high, probability 2 sufficiently low, the predicted time span before stopping
low, the temporal discount rate low, and we are risk neutral or not very risk
averse. There will thus be a fairly large cluster of estimates of these probabil-
ities that make it rational to choose track 2.
Let us, however, complicate matters by imagining that we are faced with not
a two-way choice but a three-way choice. There is yet another track, track 3,
with the same number of people on the track and at the sides as on track 1, the
“certain” track. However, on track 3 a large sign says that there is a possibility
that we may learn how to stop the trolley somewhere along the track and
proceed in a way so that we can both save those lying on the track and help
those sitting at the side. It further states that the probability involved may be
less than the probability on track 2, but that the information needed to say
whether it is less and how much is unavailable at the time we have to choose.
Given that track 3 is no worse and may be better than the first, “certain”
track, we know that we should never choose track 1, but the choice between the
two uncertain tracks becomes very complicated and will depend critically on
our assessment of the different probabilities involved.
Because I am modeling here the current state of stem cell research, we do,
however, have a further option. We can send more than one trolley down the
tracks. Should we send two trolleys down track 2 and 3? The choice between
sending a trolley down track 3 only and sending trolleys down track 2 and 3
will crucially depend on our assessment of whether one of the following
scenarios is likely to occur: (1) our progress in finding a way to stop the trolley
on track 2 will be so much faster than on track 3, that it outweighs the initial
extra loss of life; or (2) on track 2 we will learn things about helping the needy
that we will never learn on track 3. Let us translate this back to stem cell
research, where track 2 is destructive research and track 3 all kinds of nonde-
structive research. If embryos have moral status, our pure consequentialist
analysis shows that we should pursue only destructive research (on any kind of
human beings) if either (1) this line of research will produce valuable thera-
peutic results much faster than any of the different nondestructive lines of
research, or (2) destructive research will be the only way to produce cures or
treatments for certain diseases. At present, I submit that we have no strong
reasons to believe that any of these two scenarios are likely to be the case and
that the pure consequentialist argument therefore at present supports a restric-
tion of stem cell research to nondestructive research.
The Anti–Stem Cell Arguments
The direct arguments against the derivation of human embryonic stem cells, the
anti–stem cell arguments, do, like the standard liberal argument, focus on the
moral status of the embryo.
The standard restrictive argument proceeds from the premise that the life of
human individuals is intrinsically valuable at all stages of life. Killing or
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destroying a human being is, therefore, always pro tanto wrong (or, to put it
differently, the act always contains at least one wrong-making feature).
The most radical version of the standard restrictive argument claims that all
human beings have the same value. On this view, destroying embryos is just as
bad as destroying adults, and it seems to rule out any kind of destructive stem
cell derivation from embryos (at least if the direct consequentialist argument
discussed above does not go through).
This view leads to a number of counterintuitive conclusions in other areas if
it is pursued rigorously. It rules out abortion in most, or perhaps all, cases and
would, for instance, definitely rule out abortions in cases of rape. It would also
put a stop to all kinds of IVF involving the generation of supernumerary
embryos and all destructive embryo experiments aimed at improving IVF. It
would, finally, also commit us to doing much more to prevent loss of embryos
or fetuses during normal reproduction.
Others, including myself, have argued that, although human life is intrinsi-
cally valuable at all stages of life, it generally becomes more valuable during
the development from fertilized egg to adult human being. This is either
argued on the basis of potentiality or on the basis that as the developing human
being acquires new characteristics the act of killing it entails more and more
wrong-making features (because it deprives it of more and more of what it has,
as well as of everything it will get in the future).10
It is a commonplace in the “liberal” literature to discount potentiality with-
out any serious consideration, but the arguments used are often exceedingly
superficial and build on a conflation of potentiality and mere logical possibility.
On a gradualist analysis of the moral status of the human being through its
developmental stages, destroying embryos is always wrong to some degree and
cannot be done just for any kind of benefit. One great advantage of a gradualist
analysis applied to stem cell research is that it can explain why destructive use
of embryos for stem cell production is less problematic than the destructive use
of fetuses, or infants.
But if embryos have value, the question is whether the benefits of stem cell
research are of the right kind and large enough to justify the destruction of
some valuable embryos. The benefits definitely seem to be of the right kind.
Helping or perhaps even curing people who are suffering from horrendous
diseases is clearly an ethically worthwhile activity and a good goal to pursue.11
But what about the magnitude of the benefit; is it also large enough?
One way of answering this question is by finding some other analogous
activity where we sacrifice embryos to produce some good. It has been argued
by my colleague John Harris that “normal” reproduction is such an activity.12
For every pregnancy brought to term, on average 3–5 embryos fail to implant
or undergo spontaneous abortion some time during pregnancy. Harris argues
that, if we accept that loss of embryos by engaging in reproduction (or just not
protecting against reproduction), we are forced by reasons of consistency also
to allow similar sacrifice of embryos for goals of equal importance. Let us for
the sake of argument accept Harris’s analysis.13 How much embryonic stem cell
research would it commit us to allowing?
If the trade-off is one life produced for every six embryos used, probably not
very much. First, we have to remember that we cannot just count lives saved
by stem cell therapies and assume that if we save one life for every six embryos
destroyed we will be ethically all right. We can save the same life many times,
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and it is questionable whether every new saving counts equally. If I am
hand-ventilating a patient, do I save his life anew with every compression of
the ventilation bag?14 We also have to take account of the fact that many stem
cell therapies are not lifesaving but life extending or quality-of-life enhancing.
We therefore need a metric that can take account of all of these considerations.
One such metric is the QALY (quality adjusted life year). QALYs have many
problems, but none of them should be of relevance to the following analysis.
Assuming a low-average life span of 72 years for a newborn, the “normal”
trade-off works out as 12 life years per embryo, or, if we assume that some of
these are of lower quality than others so that the net QALY gain per newborn
is only 60 QALYs, we still have a trade-off of 10 QALYs per embryo.
A recent paper from one of the well-known groups in the field reports the
generation of one definite and two possible embryonic stem cell lines from 50
blastocysts (and 101 fertilized eggs).15 If we assume that all the cell lines are
true embryonic stem cells, this is equivalent to a 1 in 16.6 ratio between embryo
use and cell line production.
If all three cell lines turned out to be therapeutically useful, it would thus
seem that they would each have to produce health improvements equivalent to
at least 166 QALYs to be equivalent to normal human reproduction.16 It is,
however, unlikely that all the cell lines generated will ever have any therapeu-
tic usefulness. Many will only be used for basic research, and others will be
discarded because they are less easy to work with than other similar lines. It
might also be the case that the use of adult stem cell lines derived in nonde-
structive ways will become the preferred option in a number of therapeutic
areas, or we may be able to create stem cells without the involvement of
embryos, both developments leaving the derived embryonic stem cell lines
unproductive. We are still at such an early stage of development that we have
no way of estimating how many of the stem cell lines that are derived will
eventually be used for therapeutic purposes. But, all in all, the considerations
here indicate that on this type of consistency argument the stem cell lines that
are actually used would have to produce major therapeutic benefits.
As discussed in the first section of this paper, the standard liberal argument
has a number of rather embarrassing consequences if it is really taken seriously.
The same is true of the standard restrictive argument discussed in this section,
even in its gradualist version. If embryos have significant moral status it would
commit us to a much stricter abortion policy than many find acceptable,
although it would be possible to allow abortions in certain circumstances, and
it would also commit us to rethinking our research priorities with regard to
embryo and fetal loss during normal pregnancy.
The Policy Stalemate
As I have discussed, each side in the debate on stem cells has a number of
rather nasty skeletons in their ethical cupboard that are usually hidden from
public view. The full implications of the views are not explored in public
debate, and if they are pointed out by opponents they are often dismissed as
irrelevant to the current debate. This unfortunately leads to a dishonest public
debate. The participants are perhaps on analysis minimally truthful (i.e., they
do not lie), but they nevertheless argue in a way that is (intentionally?)
misleading.
The Ethical Case against Stem Cell Research
377
These features of the debate contribute to the policy stalemate that can be
discerned in every country where public policy has been formulated on human
embryonic stem cells. Neither side of the debate has a policy that is consistent
with the full implications of its arguments,17 and neither side seems very
interested in pressing for such a fully consistent policy!
This situation should perhaps in itself make us wary of trying to decide
public policy based purely on consistency arguments (because they seem to be
very selectively employed), but let us nevertheless as good philosophers try to
see how far consistency will get us when applied to the regulation of stem cell
research.
When consistency is invoked concerning public policy, the claim is that
certain features of current regulation in a specific area logically (or perhaps
slightly weaker, morally) commit regulators to regulate new areas in a specific
way for reasons of consistency or parity of reasoning.18 This type of argument
occurs in two subtypes. The first subtype is:
1. Authority X promulgates regulation R.
2. X puts forward an incomplete argument A supporting R.
3. A can be made complete by the addition of premises P1–Pn .
4. The complete argument A will (perhaps with the addition of some further
premises that X accepts) also support regulation C.
5. X is therefore, by parity of reasoning, committed to accept regulation C.
The second subtype is:
1. Authority X promulgates regulation R.
2. The justification for R can be reconstructed as argument A*.
3. The argument A* will (perhaps with the addition of some further premises
that X accepts) also support regulation C.
4. X is therefore, by parity of reasoning, committed to accept regulation C.
These “official policy” based arguments may fail if our reconstruction and
completion of the underlying arguments are wrong, but a further possible
mode of failure occurs if the regulation R has been promulgated in a situation
where R is the result of a compromise, either because X has openly engaged in
a compromise with some other group or because X has already taken the views
of some other group into account when drafting the regulation (for instance, to
ensure a smooth passage through the political process). If a regulation is based
on a political compromise, it may well be the case that no one wants to defend
or justify the position reached in the regulation, except as a legitimate result of
a legitimate political process.19
An example could be the abortion legislation in countries allowing abortion
on demand until a certain gestational age. It is unlikely that many people
would actually claim to have an argument that can justify the exact limit
legislated in a specific country, but many more might be willing to accept it as
a legitimate political compromise between those wanting a higher limit and
those wanting a lower limit. Such laws do, therefore, not necessarily imply that
something radical is thought to happen to the moral status of the fetus or the
moral rights of the mother when the gestational age in question is reached.
A consistency argument based on official policy also needs to take into
account that there are limits to the preciseness with which one can draft
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regulation and that ethically extraneous factors play a role. As Beauchamp and
Childress write:
Public policy is often formulated in contexts that are marked by
profound social disagreements, uncertaincies, and different interpreta-
tions of history. No body of abstract moral principles and rules can
determine policy in such circumstances, because it cannot contain
enough specific information or provide direct and discerning guid-
ance. The specification and implementation of moral principles and
rules must take account of problems of feasibility, efficiency, cultural
pluralism, political procedures, uncertainty about risk, noncompliance
by patients, and the like. (pp. 8–9)20
In evaluating official policy it is also very important not to forget that the ideal
policy has to be both locally and globally coherent and consistent and that
maximal coherence in a body of regulations may be achieved by allowing some
local inconsistencies. In many legal systems it is, for instance, accepted that a
major change in legal status occurs at birth. This principle permeates many
areas of law, also outside of the laws strictly dealing with reproductive matters,
and it is at least arguable that global consistency is better served by upholding
it in all cases, even if there are a few cases where it might seem to be locally
inconsistent.
In the context of stem cell research, one particular consistency argument is
often put forward claiming that, because destructive research using embryos
for certain purposes is already allowed in a given jurisdiction, consistency
requires that we allow the destructive use of embryos for stem cell research.21,22
Many countries that presently allow experiments on embryos restrict these
experiments to those related to improving reproductive technologies and in-
creasing our understanding of the biology of human reproduction. Many types
of stem cell research fall outside this restriction and are therefore not permitted
even though the jurisdictions in question allow other forms of research on
embryos.
Can a restriction of embryo research to reproductive matters be justified?
The decision to allow embryo research for a restricted range of research
questions could possibly be reconstructed as an attempt to achieve consistency
in a situation where embryo research is believed to be (somewhat) ethically
problematic.23 Most legal regulation of embryo research occurs within the
broader context of regulation of assisted reproductive technologies, and it is
evident that these technologies could only have been developed, and can only
be improved, if embryo research is permitted. Any legislation that allows the
use of assisted reproductive technologies and prohibits embryo research could
therefore be charged with a form of performative inconsistency, by prohibiting
a necessary step in the development and improvement of a permitted technique.24
Would it then be inconsistent not to allow research using embryos with no
connection to reproduction?
Michael Walzer has famously argued that society contains several separate
“spheres of justice” and that the application of principles of justice from one
sphere to another is not necessarily warranted.25 Maybe there are also separate
“spheres of consistency” when we discuss the consistency of public regulations.
This is not as strange an idea as it might perhaps initially seem.
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Walzer’s argument for different spheres of justice is that different social
goods are different and that, unless we understand and take account of this
difference in our analysis of justice, we will go wrong. He writes:
No account of the meaning of a social good, or of the sphere within
which it legitimately operates, will be uncontroversial. Nor is there
any neat procedure for generating or testing different accounts. At
best, the arguments will be rough, reflecting the diverse and conflict-
ridden character of the social life that we seek simultaneously to
understand and to regulate —but not to regulate until we understand.
I shall set aside, then, all claims made on behalf of any single distrib-
utive criterion, for no such criterion can possibly match the diversity
of social goods.26
In the same way as different social goods are different, the different social
practices aimed at producing these social goods are different. The practices in-
volved in reproduction and in securing the goods secured by reproduction are
different from the practices involved in research. There is thus no prima facie
reason to believe that arguments and conclusions valid in one of these areas can
be transferred without modification to the other area. Let me try to illustrate this.
In the area of reproductive ethics the idea that there is a strong right to
reproductive freedom or reproductive liberty has gained currency in recent
years. If a given permissive legal regulation has been passed because of an
appreciation of this right (for instance, concerning the creation, use, and
destruction of embryos in the sphere of ARTs), then it is not immediately
obvious that consistency requires the same kind of permissive regulation
outside of the sphere of reproduction. A right to reproductive liberty cannot,
for instance, in itself support a permission to use embryos for nonreproduction-
related purposes, such as stem cell research! And, given that the right to
reproductive liberty is most often justified by arguments pointing to the central
position of reproductive projects in the lives of (most) people, it also follows
that the consideration justifying a right to reproductive liberty cannot directly
support the production of embryos for nonreproduction-related purposes (whether
they be research or other purposes).
In looking at consistency arguments in the public policy sphere, we might
also want to question whether “as morally acceptable” 27 is a transitive relation
in this context. If p is as morally acceptable as q, and q is as morally acceptable
as r, have we therefore committed ourselves to the judgment that p is as
morally acceptable as r?
Moral acceptability comes in at least two different forms, and the difference
between them can be brought out by considering Tranøy’s analysis of moral
disagreement and consensus. If two people A and B discuss the morality of p,
there are, according to Tranøy, three possible outcomes:
1. Person A and B can agree that p is unacceptable, i.e., both mean
positively that p should not be accepted,
2. A and B can agree that p is acceptable, i.e., both mean positively that
p should be accepted,
3. A and B can agree that p is acceptable, but A or B might abstain from
actively taking a stand on p. (p. 155)28
Tranøy calls the last option “open consensus.” 29
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Let us call the kind of moral acceptability where both decisionmakers
positively affirm the moral acceptability of p “moral acceptability” and the
kind of moral acceptability where one of the decisionmakers abstains from
taking a stand on p “moral acceptability*.” Let us assume that moral accept-
ability is transitive; does this entail that moral acceptability* is also transitive?
Clearly not. The judgment of moral acceptability* may occur for a number of
different reasons. The case p may for B be in a gray area between the clearly
acceptable or the clearly unacceptable, or B may defer to A’s judgment because
the question at issue is much more important for A. Moral acceptability* is thus
only transitive in those cases where B’s reason for abstaining from actively
taking a stand on p is shared by q and r, and, because these reasons may be
nonmoral, transitivity of moral acceptability* only occurs if we can claim parity
of reasoning for both the moral features and the nonmoral features of p, q,
and r.
It should be relatively obvious that the kind of moral acceptability that lies
behind public regulation of controversial areas in bioethics is most often not
moral acceptability but moral acceptability*. This means that purely ethical
consistency arguments are often misapplied, because they assume a transitivity
of moral acceptability that often is not there.
Conclusion
In this paper, I established that the standard liberal arguments for allowing
stem cell research are problematic, as are the standard restrictive arguments.
For this reason, they cannot be used to guide public policy.
I have further shown that any line of argument trying to circumvent a
reliance on the standard arguments by instead relying on consistency to guide
public policy formation in this area is also problematic because (1) there are
general problems with consistency arguments as they are currently used,
(2) there are specific problems affecting consistency arguments in public policy,
and (3) there are even more specific problems in seeking consistency between
the sphere of reproductive issues (where personal reproductive liberty plays a
major role) and the sphere of research and therapy.
These conclusions are all negative but should not, on reflection, be terribly
controversial.30 The positive, but controversial, conclusion is that at least some
of these problems can be resolved by adopting a gradualist position on the
moral status of the embryo. If we adopt a gradualist position, we will find that
we need good reasons to perform any kind of experiments on embryos but that
such experiments are not ruled out tout court. This means that it is up to the
scientists to present convincing arguments that destructive embryonic stem cell
research is necessary to produce cures and treatments for important human
diseases.
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